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State Wiretaps and Electronic
Surveillance After September 11
by
CHARLES H. KENNEDY & PETER P. SWIRE
For this symposium on Enforcing Privacy Rights, this Article
turns its attention to an area of longstanding, large, and growing
significance-the use of wiretaps and other electronic surveillance at
the state level. The longstanding importance of wiretap law to
enforcing privacy rights is underscored by the 1928 case of Olmstead
v. United States.' The Supreme Court in Olmstead permitted a police
wiretap without a search warrant of telephone calls from a home.
The case is best remembered, however, for the dissent by Justice
Brandeis, who declared: "As a means of espionage, writs of
assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny
and oppression when compared with wire-tapping."' Justice Brandeis
famously continued that "[t]he makers of our Constitution...
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."
4
As discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court in the
1960s eventually shifted to the position of Justice Brandeis. It held
that wiretaps by both federal and state officials are subject to
constitutional scrutiny where there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy Congress then enacted wiretap and electronic surveillance
* Charles H. Kennedy is a partner with Morrison & Foerster, LLP. Peter P. Swire is
Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University and a
consultant to Morrison & Foerster, LLP. For the underlying survey of the state wiretap
and electronic surveillance laws, the authors are grateful for assistance by attorneys and
researchers at Morrison & Foerster including Laurence Bolton, Jennifer Cetta, John F.
Cox, William D. Freedman, Jennifer Kostyu, Jonathan Levi, Elisa Metzger, Iris Rosario,
and Nadja Sodos-Wallace. Our thanks especially to John F. Cox for his contributions to
this article.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
2. Id. at 466.
3. Id. at 476.
4. Id. at 478.
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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laws to implement the Court's holdings. These statutes in some
respects set minimum standards for wiretaps by state officials. In
other respects, however, the states retain considerable discretion in
whether and how they will conduct wiretaps and other electronic
surveillance.
The importance of state wiretaps comes in part from their
volume. According to the most recent Wiretap Report of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, at least sixty-seven
percent of wiretap applications approved in 2001 were authorized by
state judges (1,005 of 1,491). 6  Even more remarkably, while
applications approved by federal judges in 2001 increased only one
percent from the number authorized in 2000, approvals by state
judges rose forty-one percent.7
Beyond mere volume, state legislatures have recently considered
numerous proposals to alter wiretap and electronic surveillance law.
The nature of these proposals is of particular interest in light of the
USA PATRIOT Act, which was passed in the wake of the September
11 attacks.' The USA PATRIOT Act contains "sunset" provisions so
that some of the new surveillance powers are scheduled to expire in
the fall of 2005.9 As Congress considers whether to extend or modify
those surveillance powers, it will be useful to see how state legislators
have been addressing the same issues.
The volume and diversity of state wiretap law and practice has
not been accompanied by corresponding scrutiny. At the federal
level, academics, the press, advocacy groups, and Congressional
oversight have all provided important checks on any temptation by
federal officials to overstep the limits of their surveillance powers. By
contrast, we have not found any significant recent research on the law
and practice of state wiretaps and other electronic surveillance."°
Even more troubling to our understanding of state wiretaps, it
appears that some states may be failing to meet their obligation to
report their wiretapping activity to the federal government. The 2001
Wiretap Report of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts says that forty-six jurisdictions have laws permitting the
6. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE 2001 WIRETAP REPORT 7 (2002),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap0l/contents.html. Because of the likely under-
reporting of state wiretaps, the percentage of state wiretaps is likely even higher.
7. Id. Of the 1,491 surveillance applications made to state and federal judges in 2001,
not one was rejected. Id.
8. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
9. Id. § 224.
10. For an earlier study of state wiretap practices, which found serious and pervasive
weakness in judicial control of state wiretaps, see generally SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE
EAVESDROPPERS (1959).
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issuance of interception orders, but that judges from only twenty-five
states reported using that authority in 2001. Although it is possible
that twenty-one states issued no interception orders in that year, it
seems more likely that states are failing to make the required reports.
Additional evidence of under-reporting is the mismatch between
reports from state courts and prosecutors; the Wiretap Report in 2001
identified at least thirty-five wiretaps that were reported by state
courts but not, as mandated by law, by prosecutors.
To help fill the gaps in our knowledge, the research in this article
was done under the umbrella of the Liberty and Security Initiative of
the Constitution Project.13 The Initiative was launched in the fall of
2001 as a bipartisan effort to study and seek consensus on issues
affecting liberty and security after September 11. The research on
state wiretap and electronic surveillance was done by the Privacy and
Technology Committee of the Initiative. Professor Peter Swire serves
as the academic reporter for this research. 4 Charles Kennedy is the
project leader at the law firm of Morrison & Foerster LLP, which has
contributed research on a pro bono basis.
Part I of the Article sets forth the constitutional and statutory
framework for state wiretap and electronic surveillance law. Part II
presents the key results from the study of the laws in the fifty states.
Detailed reports on each state are and will remain available on the
Internet. 5 The results here discuss the highlights of state wiretap and
electronic surveillance legislation that has been proposed and enacted
since September 11. The detailed reports also describe the key
wiretap and electronic surveillance provisions in each state. Part III
discusses implications and conclusions.
I. State Wiretap Laws: The Constitutional and
Statutory Framework
Colonial Americans were acutely aware of the risks posed by
physical searches of homes, offices, and other private places, and
physical seizures of persons, papers, and other effects. These physical
intrusions by the government were squarely addressed in the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Twentieth
Century, however, saw the use of mechanical and electronic devices
that could capture private communications even where the police
performed no physical trespass. The lack of a trespass was of key
11. 2001 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
12. Id. at 9.
13. See http://www.constitutionproject.org.
14. Professor Jeffrey Rosen of the George Washington University Law School serves




doctrinal importance in Olmstead, leading the majority there to
decide that there was no constitutionally protected "search."' 6 The
1967 decision of Katz v. United States shifted the Fourth Amendment
focus to "people, not places."' 7  Since Katz, the central doctrinal
question for surveillance has been whether an individual has a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in a particular communication."
Our survey of state law addresses three basic categories of
investigative techniques. The first category is where those doing the
surveillance listen in to the content of the communications. Police or
others might learn the content of communications by means of
electronic eavesdropping, or bugging. This eavesdropping is typically
accomplished by placing a listening device in or near an area where
targeted conversations are likely to take place. These devices acquire
the conversations in their acoustic, rather than electronic, form. The
devices record the conversations or transmit them to law enforcement
personnel at a listening post or other location. The police or others
can also learn the content of communications by means of wiretaps,
which intercept the content during the course of electronic
transmission over a radio or wireline facility. Since Katz, the courts
have applied the "reasonable expectation of privacy standard" to
bugging and wiretaps to determine whether a Fourth Amendment
"search" has occurred.'" In this Article, we will use the term
"wiretaps" to refer generically to wiretaps and bugging.
A second category is where police or others learn the "to/from"
information of communications. The term "pen register" is used to
refer to the list of telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, or similar
information that receives a communication from the target of the
investigation. The term "trap-and-trace device" is used where
communications are traced back to their source, such as the phone
number from which a call is made. The Supreme Court held in 1979
that this to/from information, under the facts of that case, was not
subject to a "reasonable expectation of privacy."2  This to/from
information has thus not been subject to the probable cause standard
of the Fourth Amendment.
The third category concerns records stored in the hands of third
parties, such as banks, telephone companies, and Internet service
providers. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment
does not prevent third parties from voluntarily turning over the
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
17. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
18. Id. at 360, 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
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stored records to law enforcement." In our modern world, where the
content of so much sensitive personal information is held by third
parties, law enforcement officials can often learn about content or
to/from information from stored records rather than by intercepting a
call or e-mail as it occurs.22
The legal framework for these three categories of state laws is
subject to two important constraints: first, the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, as incorporated in and made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment; and second,
the restrictions of federal statutes such as the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA").23
The Fourth Amendment was first applied to state-ordered
electronic surveillance by the Supreme Court in 1967. In Berger v.
New York, the Court found New York's eavesdropping statute to be
constitutionally defective because it did not require a showing of
probable cause before an eavesdropping order would issue, and did
not require specification of the crime that had been or was being
committed and of the particular conversations being sought.24 The
statute also suffered other constitutional infirmities, because it
authorized orders of excessive duration; did not require orders to be
promptly executed; permitted extensions of the original
eavesdropping period without a showing of probable cause; did not
require termination of the eavesdropping once the conversation
sought was seized; did not require a showing of "exigency" to justify
use of eavesdropping as an investigative technique; and did not
require a return of the warrant.25
The Berger decision gave the states a detailed guide to
compliance with the Fourth Amendment in their use of
eavesdropping and wiretap techniques. After Berger, states were on
21. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 54 (1974).
22. The pervasiveness of stored records, and the lack of constitutional protection
against law enforcement access to such records, has been the subject of increasing
attention. For instance, one of the authors (Professor Swire) chaired a White House
Working Group in 2000 on how to update wiretap and surveillance laws for the Internet.
In a speech announcing the Clinton Administration's legislative proposal, Chief of Staff
John Podesta stressed the changed circumstances when e-mails and so many other sorts of
personal communications are likely available in storage in the hands of third parties.
Remarks by President's Chief of Staff John D. Podesta on Electronic Privacy to National
Press Club (July 18, 2000), in FDCH FEDERAL DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY
DOCUMENTS. For a recent scholarly discussion of the issue, see Daniel Solove, Digital
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083
(2002).
23. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986).
24. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-55, 58-59 (1967).
25. Id. at 59-60.
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notice that their surveillance statutes and practices must ensure"adequate judicial supervision" and "protective procedures., 26
Specifically, orders must be issued by a judge, upon a showing of
probable cause, with specification of the crime committed or about to
be committed and the conversation or conversations to be seized.27
Issuance of an order must be based upon a showing of circumstances
that justify the use of the intrusive techniques of interception or
eavesdropping. 28 The orders must be for a limited time and subject to
a requirement of prompt execution. 29 Extensions of an order must be
based upon probable cause, and the order must be returnable to the
court to ensure judicial supervision of the order's execution.3 °
These constraints were codified and made more specific in Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968."1
"Title III," as it is generally called, established substantive and
procedural requirements for federal interception orders.32 It also
specifically preempted less restrictive state requirements.3 In 1986,
Congress updated those requirements by means of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, which addressed newer
communications technologies such as mobile telephones and
electronic mail.34 (For convenience, we refer generically to the
requirements of Title III and the ECPA as "ECPA requirements.")
The ECPA broadly prohibits all interceptions of the contents of
wire, oral, and electronic communications, except where those
interceptions comply with the ECPA requirements. 5  Where
interceptions will be made by law enforcement agencies, the ECPA
specifies the officials who may apply for an order, the crimes or
categories of crimes in connection with which an order may be
sought, the probable cause showing that the applicant must make, and
the findings and "minimization" requirements that the order must
contain.36 The ECPA also requires state and federal courts issuing
interception orders to make detailed reports concerning those orders
to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.37 The
ECPA also sets forth standards for pen register and trap-and-trace
26. Id. at 60.
27. Id. at 54-59.
28. See id. at 54-63.
29. See id. at 57-60.
30. See id. at 59-60.
31. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (2000)), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 237.
32. Id. §§ 2510-20.
33. Id. § 2515.
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (2000).
35. Id. § 2511.
36. Id. § 2516-18.
37. Id. § 2519.
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orders, and for government access to stored records held by third
parties. 8
Under the Fourth Amendment and ECPA constraints, states
that wished to perform wiretaps were required to enact statutes that
closely track the probable cause, minimization and other
requirements of federal law. As we discuss further below, however, it
is less clear that the states' institutional frameworks for electronic
surveillance are as fully developed or protective of civil liberties as
the federal regime.
II. Survey of State Wiretap Laws and
Post-September 11 Amendments
Our research so far has resulted in the preparation and
publication of two multi-page matrices. One matrix, titled State
Wiretap Legislation, summarizes the legislative initiatives undertaken
by several states in the initial period after the attacks of
September 11, 2001."9 The other matrix, titled State Wiretap Laws,
summarizes the provisions of state statutes for wiretaps, to/from
information, and stored records, including those that have not been
amended since September 11, 2001.0 Both matrices are and will be
available on the Internet."
We have found that most states (exceptions are noted on the
second matrix) have enacted wiretap statutes. Not surprisingly, we
have found that much of the post-September 11 legislation liberalizes,
or proposes to liberalize, the state wiretap and other electronic
surveillance laws. The chief categories of recently proposed changes
include: expanding the list of offenses in connection with which
interception orders may be granted; expanding the list of officials who
may request wiretaps; expanding the categories of persons who may
execute wiretaps; authorizing "roving" surveillance and surveillance
across broader geographic areas; and expanding the types of
communications and devices subject to interception.
38. Id. §§ 3121-27,2701-11.
39. See Appendix A, infra page 987.
40. See Appendix B, infra page 1163.
41. In addition to their publication here, the matrices, including possible updates, are






A. Expanding the List of Offenses in Connection with Which Interception
Orders May Be Granted
A number of amendments and proposed amendments to state
laws add computer crimes and "terrorism," including various
terrorism-related crimes, to the lists of offenses for which wiretap and
similar authority may be granted.42 These changes appear to be
consistent with the requirements of the ECPA, which permits state
interception orders in connection with
the offense of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery,
extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other
dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or
property, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,
designated in any applicable State statute authorizing such
interception, or any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
offenses.43
However, expansion of the state wiretap authority to include
investigations of "terrorism" increases the likelihood of misuse of the
surveillance power. Even at the federal level, where law enforcement
has substantial experience with investigation of terrorist
organizations, the loose statutory definitions of terrorism and
terrorist-related activities, and the tendency of some officials to
equate unpopular political expression with support for terrorism,
have led to notorious abuses." State authorities are less experienced
in investigating "terrorism" and generally less subject to scrutiny from
advocacy organizations, the press, and other outside groups.
Expanded state investigations into "terrorism," therefore, could pose
42. S.B. 1427, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002) (terrorist acts); A.B. 74, 2001-02
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (passed Sept. 17, 2002) (weapons of mass destruction and
destructive devices, including "attempts" to commit those offenses); H.B. 5759, 2002 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2002) (terrorism and computer crime in furtherance of terrorist
purposes); H.B. 1439, 104th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2002) (terrorism); H.B. 53A, 2002 1st
Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2002) (terrorist acts); H.B. 100, 416th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2002) (unauthorized access to a computer); S.B. 184, 124th Gen. Assem., 2001-02
Sess. (Ohio 2001) (soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism, making a
terroristic threat, terrorism); H.B. 1120, 2002 Sess. (Va. 2002) (terrorism offenses); S.B.
514, 2002 Sess. (Va. 2002) (terrorism offenses).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).
44. See, for example, the FBI's anti-terrorism investigation of the Committee In
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador ("CISPES"), which resulted in legal action
against, and admissions of wrongdoing by, the Bureau. Comm. in Solidarity with the
People of El Salvador v. Sessions, 929 F.2d 742, 743-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Philip B.
Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 444 (2002). See generally MORTON HALPERIN, ET AL., THE
LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES (1976) (providing
detailed history of illegal intelligence activities, which were often justified as necessary to
combat Communist and other foreign threats).
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significant risks of abuse, including abuse of First Amendment rights
of free expression.
B. Expanding the List of Officials Who May Request Wiretap Authority
Under the ECPA, an application to a state court judge for an
interception order must be made by the "principal prosecuting
attorney of [the] State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any
political subdivision thereof."45 The purpose of the requirement is the
same as that of the counterpart ECPA requirement that federal
applications be made by the Attorney General or designated persons
responsible to the Attorney General, i.e., to centralize "in a publicly
responsible official subject to the political process the formulation of
[electronic surveillance policy so that s]hould abuses occur, the lines
of responsibility lead to an identifiable person."46
State wiretap statutes vary widely in the degree of centralized
decision-making they require. Some states permit applications to be
made by a variety of officials, including county prosecutors.47 Other
states require that the application be preceded by the request or
authorization of a central authority.48
To the extent we have seen recent legislative action concerning
the officers that may request surveillance, the trend has been in the
direction of dispersal rather than centralization of the power to bring
such requests. Notably, a new Louisiana law expands, and a bill
introduced in the Kentucky legislature would expand, the list of
officials that may apply for wiretap orders.49 Similarly, a bill
introduced in the New York Assembly would add the chief counsel of
a temporary state commission of investigation to the list of officials
that may request a pen register or trap-and-trace order.
C. Expanding the Categories of Persons Who May Execute Wiretaps
The training and competence of the persons who execute wiretap
orders (sometimes called "monitors") are critical to the protection of
the rights of subjects of surveillance. In addition to maintaining
accurate activity logs (essential if there is to be any accountability for
the way orders are implemented), monitors must be trained to
minimize interceptions and discontinue monitoring when the
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).
46. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 97 (1968), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2185.
47. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:156A-8 (West 2003).
48. See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 18.20 § 6 (Vernon 2003).
49. H.B. 53A, 2002 1st Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2002); H.B. 119, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2002).
50. A.B. 5212, 224th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001); S.B. 2156, 224th Ann. Leg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2001).
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intercepted conversation is privileged or not probative of crime.' For
federal wiretaps, federal agents receive extensive training to 2comply
with the detailed requirements under Title III and the ECPA.
Under the ECPA, state-authorized interceptions may be carried
out only by "investigative or law enforcement officers having
responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the
application is made."53  However, the ECPA permits private
contractors to conduct interceptions, so long as the contractor's
personnel are "under the supervision of an investigative or law
enforcement officer authorized to conduct the interception. 54 The
statutory authority to hire contractors for surveillance duty frees
professional law enforcement personnel from the drudgery of staffing
monitoring stations, but complicates the task of ensuring that persons
who conduct surveillance are experienced and properly trained in the
intricacies of executing an electronic surveillance order.
After September 11, 2001, a number of state legislatures
expanded, or proposed to expand, the kinds of personnel who may
conduct surveillance pursuant to interception orders. For example,
Idaho now permits a wiretap to be conducted "by government
personnel or by an individual operating under a contract with federal,
state or local government and acting under the supervision of an
investigative or law enforcement officer authorized to conduct the
interception.""5 In Illinois, the legislature has proposed to define
"electronic criminal surveillance officer" to include retired law
enforcement officers certified by the Department of State Police to
intercept private oral communications. 6
D. Authorizing "Roving" and Statewide Surveillance
Earlier wiretaps generally applied to a specific phone line. After
September 11, states are increasingly introducing legislation to
authorize "roving" wiretaps-i.e., orders that permit surveillance of
any communications device a target of an investigation is likely to
51. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 30-31, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3584-85.
52. For training materials used by the Department of Justice, see, for example,
COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELL. PROP. SEC., CRIM. DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIM. INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
s&smanual2002.htm (on file with the Hastings Law Journal); OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
OPERATIONS, CRIM. DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
MANUAL (1991) (on file with the Catholic University of America Law Library).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2).
54. Id. § 2518(5).
55. S.B. 1349, 56th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2002).
56. H.B. 4074, 92d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2003).
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use, without specifying the telephone or other facilities in the orders
or applications.
Roving wiretaps have been permitted for years under the ECPA,
which authorizes a court to order such an interception upon a
showing that the target of the investigation is changing
communication devices frequently and that this conduct "could have
the effect of thwarting" the investigation. 7  Until recently, that
procedure was not available for investigations under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"). The USA PATRIOT Act
harmonized the two statutes by extending roving wiretap authority to
foreign intelligence investigations.58 In the aftermath of September
11, a number of bills in the state legislatures also proposed to remove
statutory restrictions on use of roving wiretaps by law enforcement.
Maryland's new statute, for example, permits "roving" orders for
the interception of wire, oral and electronic communications.59 For
wiretaps, a "roving" order is permitted if the application: (1) is by an
officer; (2) is approved by the attorney general, the state prosecutor,
or a state's attorney; (3) identifies the person committing the offense
and whose communications are to be intercepted; (4) makes a
showing of probable cause that the person could thwart the
interception from the facility; and (5) specifies that the interception
will be limited to any period of time in which the officer has a
reasonable, articulable belief that the suspect will be using thosefacilities."°
Similarly, bills introduced in the Minnesota and New York
legislatures would permit roving wiretaps as a means of intercepting
communications of persons suspected of terrorist activity;61 and
legislation was introduced in Wisconsin that would have permitted
roving wiretaps.62
57. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii). Roving wiretaps were authorized for domestic
surveillance in 1986, in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, § 106(d)(3), 100 Stat.
at 1857 (1986). In 1998, the 1051h Congress amended the roving wiretap statute and
reduced the mens rea requirement for requesting authorities from cases in which the target
had a "purpose... to thwart interception by changing facilities," 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(11)(b)(ii) (1997), to cases in which the suspect's actions "could have the effect of
thwarting interception from a specified facility." Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat.
2396, 2413 (1998). For a critical discussion of the amendment of the roving wiretap
statute, see Bryan R. Faller, The 1998 Amendment to the Roving Wiretap Statute: Congress
"Could Have" Done Better, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2093 (1999).
58. USA PATRIOT Act §206 (2001), 15 Stat. 272, 282 (2001).
59. H.B. 100, 416th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002).
60. Id.
61. H.B. 2909, 82d Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2001); S.B. 5793, 225th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y.
2001).
62. S.B. 363, 95th Leg. Sess, (Wis. 2001-02).
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A number of states have also followed the federal lead in
authorizing interceptions outside of the geographic bounds of the
court's normal jurisdiction. Under the USA PATRIOT Act, federal
judges may now issue a pen register/trap-and-trace order that applies
nationwide, rather than only in the district in which the judges sit. In
Florida, if an applicant demonstrates that an act involves or will
involve terrorism, a judge may now authorize an interception for
anywhere in the state even if beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the
court. '  Similarly, in Idaho, wiretap authorization now extends
beyond the issuing court's territorial jurisdiction to include the entire
state.65
In Maryland, a judge may authorize continued interception
throughout the state if the original interception occurred within the
judge's jurisdiction.66  The definition of an authorizing judge is
expanded to include circuit courts having jurisdiction over the crime
being investigated, regardless of the location of the instrument or
process from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted
or received.6 ' Finally, in Virginia, the amendments to the wiretap
statute remove physical location and geographic boundary
requirements from wiretap applications.'
Statutory grants of extraterritorial wiretap jurisdiction, in
particular, may dilute the ability and incentive of courts to exercise
effective control over the surveillance process. The possibilities for
abuse include law enforcement "judge shopping" and reduction of the
court's ability to supervise wiretaps that are executed in various
counties outside the court's jurisdiction.69
E. Expanding the Types of Communications and Devices Subject to
Interception
A number of bills propose to add new devices and types of
communications to those susceptible of authorized interception by
law enforcement. These include electronic communications,
63. USA PATRIOT Act § 216(a), 115 Stat. at 288.
64. H.B. 1439, 104th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2002).
65. S.B. 1349, 56th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2002).
66. H.B. 1036, 416th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002); S.B. 639,416th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002).
67. H.B. 1036, 416th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002); S.B. 639,416th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002).
68. H.B. 1120, 2002 Sess., (Va. 2002); S.B. 514,2002 Sess., (Va. 2002).
69. For a discussion of the provision to permit judges to issue orders nationwide, as
well as other electronic surveillance provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act, see Peter P.
Swire, Administration Wiretap Proposal Hits the Right Issues But Goes Too Far, Brookings
Terrorism Project Website, at http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fellows/
2001_swire.htm (Oct. 3, 2001), also available at http://www.peterswire.net.
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voicemail, cordless telephones, cellular telephones and stored
communications.70
These developments are not alarming in themselves. In adding
new devices and technologies to their wiretap statutes, states
generally are bringing their laws in line with the ECPA, which for
many years has applied to non-wireline and non-voice
communications not addressed in older wiretap statutes. Extension
of surveillance activities to any new technology, however, may
present challenges to which the training and experience of state and
local courts and law enforcement personnel may not be adequate.
III. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
Most wiretaps in the United States are performed by state
officials, yet almost all of the scrutiny of wiretap practices has applied
to the federal level. An appreciation of state law and practice is thus
central to understanding the enforcement of the privacy rights of
individuals in their telephone calls, e-mails, and other
communications. In the research performed for the Constitution
Project, we have systematically described the interception, to/from,
and stored record laws that existed in the states as of June 1, 2002.
This research shows the diversity of state laws and provides a baseline
so that interested persons over time can determine with relatively
minimal research the laws that apply in their own states.
One result of our research has been for us to consider the
meaning of the federal minimum standards provided by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and related statutes. At a
formal level, the ECPA provides that state wiretap and other laws
may have effect only if they meet the federal requirements for nature
of the offense, minimization, and so on. We believe, however, that
there are two significant ways in which the protection of rights under
state wiretaps is often less effective than for federal wiretaps.
First, the institutional setting varies for federal and state
surveillance. For federal law enforcement, institutional safeguards
and training of personnel have achieved a high degree of
sophistication. Federal wiretap requests generally are the result of
internal agency vetting, approval from the prosecuting Assistant
United States Attorney, approval from the Department of Justice's
Office of Enforcement Operations, and approval by a high-level
Department of Justice official. Only then is the application submitted
to a district court judge for approval. The Office of Enforcement
70. S.B. 459, 146th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002); S.B. 1349, 56th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Idaho 2002); H.B. 2986, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2002); A.B. 1589, 24th Ann.
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001-02); H.B. 1120, 2002 Sess. (Va. 2002); S.B. 514, 2002 Sess. (Va.
2002).
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Operations, in particular, acts as a repository of federal wiretap
judgment and expertise that can check any missteps by less
experienced prosecutorial personnel. Federal law enforcement
personnel that execute wiretap orders also receive a high level of
training.
Institutions, procedures and training at the state level are less
well understood. Some states do permit only the state police to
request and administer wiretaps. Some state law enforcement
agencies have expert departments with the ability to screen proposed
uses of surveillance techniques that are unlawful and inappropriate,
and trained operatives that can reliably execute wiretaps within the
limits of the interception orders. Other states, however, permit local
police agencies to request and carry out wiretaps. Prosecutors may
seek wiretaps who are often less fully supervised than is true in the
federal system. Based on our review of state laws, we consider it
likely that state wiretaps are often less subject to institutional controls
on prosecutorial and police discretion.
This lack of internal institutional controls is matched by a
relative lack of external controls on the discretion and actions of state
officials. Few states have their actions subjected to the same scrutiny
on civil liberties grounds that academics and numerous groups in
Washington, D.C. give to proposed and actual federal actions. Media
attention to federal activities is greater. State legislatures and their
judiciary committees often lack the staffing and expertise of the
judiciary committees in the U.S. Congress. It is likely, in addition,
that the Congressional committees display greater ongoing vigilance
on the activities of the U.S. Department of Justice than is true for
many state legislatures, which often meet for limited sessions.
Because state procedures are watched less systematically by the
press and civil liberties organizations, abuses at the state level,
whether deliberate or the result of inexperience, may not be detected.
The under-reporting of state wiretaps, discussed above, is both a
symptom of and a contributing factor to this relative lack of oversight.
The simple fact is that half of the states have wiretap powers, yet
reported no wiretaps in 2001. The utter failure to file the annual
wiretap report would be unthinkable at the federal level. In addition,
the under-reporting of state wiretaps keeps the use and possible
misuse of state wiretaps less visible.
At a policy level, the twin phenomena of weaker internal and
external controls argue for greater public oversight of state wiretap
practices. Courts and prosecutors who do not file wiretap reports
should be brought to light. States that provide wiretap authority to
prosecutors and police, without effective training or oversight, should
consider how to bring their practices up to a higher level. Watchdog
groups and the media, armed with the database about the actual laws
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in the fifty states, can ask more useful questions about how wiretaps
and related surveillance actually operate in each state.
A separate implication of this research concerns the interplay of
federal and state surveillance law. Based on the authors' own
experience, the debate on the USA PATRIOT Act in the fall of 2001
focused essentially exclusively on the scope of surveillance powers
that is appropriate for federal officials. The preemption provision in
the ECPA, however, means that a change in federal law also permits
an equivalent change in state law. Many of the bills recently
proposed or enacted in the states mirror the reduction of privacy
rights in the USA PATRIOT Act. For topics such as the definition of
"terrorist" crimes, the use of roving wiretaps, and the use of
surveillance orders statewide, the states are "catching up" to the
changes at the federal level.
In the abstract, there is no simple way to determine whether
these changes to state laws are desirable. Where the change in
federal law is desirable, an equivalent change in state law may also be
desirable. The weakness of internal and external controls at the state
level, however, throws an additional element into the mix. A change
in federal law, it turns out, has two effects: a change in the law as
applied by federal officials; and permission to the states to expand
their surveillance activities as well. This dual effect deserves the
attention of Congress as it revisits the surveillance powers that are
subject to the sunset provision in the USA PATRIOT Act. Even
where sufficient controls can be created to justify actions by federal
officials, there should be additional inquiry. Can the controls be, and
will they be, created at the state level where the large majority of
wiretaps actually occur? The actual effects of legal changes, and
potential for abuse, may lurk more in the state systems than we have
suspected.
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